

## Direct and Indirect Xenophobic Attacks: Unpacking Portfolios of Identity

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**Abstract** Political threats are typically conceptualized by scholars as targeting particular groups of people. We call for also conceptualizing threats as political attacks directed towards particular facets of an individual's identity portfolio. We reason that individual political responses to political attacks depend on the strength of identity with the group under attack, just as Social Identity Theory anticipates, but we contend that responses also depends on the shared social categories across an identity portfolio. Drawing on data from 2006 - 2016, we compare the political assessments of various presidential candidates between Mexican heritage Latinos and other non-Mexican heritage Latinos. Given the specificity of the rhetoric towards Mexican heritage Latinos in 2016, we find evidence that Mexicans and non-Mexicans cast distinct judgments of Donald Trump. Yet, we observe no comparable distinction in prior electoral contexts, suggesting that 2016 uniquely politicized the responses among Mexican heritage Latinos.

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## Introduction

Scholars have long appreciated the theoretical importance of social identities as filters that sort the complexity of political life (Converse, 1964; Campbell et al., 1960; Conover, 1988), and heuristics that simplify the calculus of forming political judgments (Dawson, 1994; Campbell et al., 1960). A central theoretical challenge has been to specify the conditions under which social identities translate into theoretically anticipated political responses (Huddy, 2003; Lee, 2008). Recent work by Pérez (2015b) and Valenzuela and Michelson (2016) leverage theoretical insights from social identity theory (SIT) to examine a set of conditions under which social identities become consequential for politics. They emphasize the analytical utility of group identification over group membership and build on the idea that individuals are motivated to uphold a positive self image (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Because of this desire to maintain a positive self image, if a positive sense of self is derived from a psychological attachment to a group(s), individuals will engage in a variety of strategies to maintain the status of the group and thus maintain a positive self image contingent on the degree of attachment to the group(s) (Ellemers et al., 2002). Pérez (2015b) points out that among high identifiers, exposure to negative appeals that devalue the group's worth leads to intensify expressions of in-group favoritism and in-group pride. Similarly, Valenzuela and Michelson note that "voting is an act of identity expression," particularly for those with a strong positive attachment to their group (2016, 618). Both research teams highlight that weak identifiers are not mobilized in pro-group ways by appeals or threats to identity. Weak and strong identifiers both respond to group threats and group appeals in a distinct yet predictable fashion (Ellemers et al., 2002). These studies also illustrate the importance of identity strength in understanding the identity-to-politics link.

While the extant literature has made it clear that in-group identities are important for political outcomes, it is unclear what happens when group based threats are directed at certain social categories that exist within an individual's set of salient social identities. We propose a novel framework to better understand the conditions under which an individual's numerous social identities matter for politics. Building off of work in comparative politics (Chandra, 2012; Posner, 2004) and social identity complexity (Roccas and Brewer, 2002), we propose that individuals possess an *identity portfolio*, which contains all the identity categories used in the political decision making processes. The degree of attachment to each of these categories varies considerably among individuals. We argue that social identity categories inform political decisions to the extent of their respective size and salience within one's portfolio. More salient social identities are more important and more easily politicized via hostile

rhetoric than those identity categories of less salience. Such identity structures have always been part of the American social and political landscape, and though they are increasingly common in a multicultural America, political science has yet to fully map out the identity-to-politics link for such complex identity structures.

Our answer to these questions knits together theoretical insight from Social Identity Theory (SIT), which emphasizes the motive to see oneself in a positive light (cf. SIT and Tajfel and Turner, 1979), with the view shared by a growing number of scholars who underscore the fluidity between distinct social identities that are contained in a larger repertoire or portfolio of identities (Carter and Pérez, 2016; Huddy et al., 2007; Huddy and Turner, 2014; Chandra, 2012). Using the identity portfolio framework, we develop a set of testable implications to understand the political consequences of targeted threat. Targeted threats are group based threats directed at one of the social identity facets within an individual's portfolio. The political response of a directed threat is conditional on the target of the threat, the degree of attachment to the threatened category, and the possibility of achieving a positive self image in a distinct yet albeit related social group.

Among those directly targeted by the hostile rhetoric, we argue that strong identifiers will embrace the threatened identity and respond to the hostile rhetoric in ways that strive to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group (Ellemers et al., 2002, 1997). For those outside of the direct threat, we predict the response will be contingent on the degree of attachment to the category under threat and the extent which one can identify with a higher status group. Consistent with existing studies, regardless of the target, we anticipate that weak identifiers will refrain from a collective pro-group response since the group is not central to their self image (Pérez, 2015b; Leach et al., 2010; Ellemers et al., 2002).

In the sections that follow we elaborate our theoretical argument and present a set of testable hypotheses derived from our theory. We test this framework in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election using Latinos as a way to explore the nuances and implications of the identity portfolio framework. We craft a research design that leverages the internal diversity of the Latino community, a group within which different configurations of social identities exist. Within the Latino community, we focus on the interplay between American, national origin, and pan-ethnic identity categories, three important identity categories for members of the Latino community that scholars have struggled to fully understand their interaction and subsequent relationship with political outcomes. We recognize that these identity categories are robustly related and likely do not encompass all the salient identity facets among the Latino community. Yet, we argue that these categories are indeed distinct and existing work has struggled with how to contend with the

fact that these “ethnic” identities are robustly related but distinct (Fraga and Garcia, 2006; Fraga et al., 2010).<sup>1</sup>

Drawing on survey data from the 2016 CMPS, we compare the political assessments of Donald J. Trump between Mexican heritage Latinos to those from non-Mexican heritage Latinos conditional on the strength of identity. We find that strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos are least supportive of Trump. This is followed by strong identifying non-Mexican heritage individuals, who also demonstrate weak support of Trump, but not to the extent of their Mexican counterparts. We think these individuals embrace their non-Mexican national origin identity as a way of preserving their self worth and maintaining a positive distinctiveness to the extent possible, a central prediction in SIT. But, given that the social category “Latino” is present in both identity portfolios, xenophobic rhetoric was also felt by strong identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos. Consistent with the broader work in SIT, we observe that weak identifiers, whether Mexican heritage or non-Mexican heritage, do little to preserve the positive distinctiveness of the group, reinforcing the consistent finding that the strength of identity is key to understanding the political response.

In addition to potentially corroborating existing work on the political effects of xenophobic rhetoric that boast “internal validity” based on experimental evidence (Pérez, 2015b), this approach adds value to our knowledge base because it tests these theoretical claims in a more externally valid, “real-world” context. We subject our claims to a quasi-experimental test by turning to observations in 2006, 2008, and 2012, which serve as “control elections” with observable Latino political responses that were expressed prior to the introduction of a targeted xenophobic rhetoric. Should no difference exist spanning a decade of electoral contests, then our claims about political attacks provoking distinct responses as a function of strength of identity *and* proximity of target are undermined. Probing the validity of our interpretation further with observational, large-n survey data, we uncover that the strength of our findings are unique to 2016 and not present in prior elections, indicating the distinction of 2016 in terms of the targeted nature of xenophobic rhetoric and its explicit focus on Mexican heritage Latinos. What we contribute, then, is a crucial supplement and a theoretical framework, which equips scholars to analytically distinguish for *whom* and *under what conditions* different facets of one’s identity portfolios are connected to politics in the face of threatening rhetoric.

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<sup>1</sup> In this paper, we focus on three social identity categories (“American”, “national origin”, and “pan-ethnic”) among Latinos. We believe our identity portfolio framework can include other distinct identities such as religion, gender, and class. However, we don’t focus on those relationships here since Latinos in the context of the 2016 elections provides an ideal test of our implication. Although our identities are “ethnic,” we don’t think this has any impact on other set of salience social identities since we argue that each of these are indeed distinct social identity categories.

## Targeted Threat and Social Identity Portfolios

Scholars have often highlighted the importance of linked fate as a predictor of group solidarity (Dawson, 1994; Leach et al., 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010). These theoretical frameworks rest on the assumption that solidarity and “linkedness” happens homogeneously within groups. However, human beings often possess diverse, competing, and opposed desires. Subjects possess a broad constellation of identities, some of which can be overlapping yet distinct (Beltran, 2010; Young, 2002). Thus, while linked fate and group consciousness has been used consistently to show group solidarity and explain variation in voting behavior, we still don’t know the political effects of targeted threats that are directed towards particular components of an identity portfolio. In other words, linked fate is perhaps too coarse of a concept for a group with such rich internal diversity, such as Latinos, or individuals with a broad constellation of social identities. Specifically, we need a theoretical framework that helps us clarify how targeted group based threats are connected to individual level political responses when existing theories fail to offer the analytic precision and detail needed.

Our approach to answering this question begins with insight from Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and its offshoot Self Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner et al., 1987). SIT theorists argue that human interaction ranges on a spectrum from being purely interpersonal on the one hand to purely intergroup on the other. When category distinctions are salient, people perceptually enhance similarities within the in-group and enhance differences between other out-groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that a motivating principle underlying behavior was a desire for a positive and secure self-concept, which could be achieved by attachment to a group (i.e., a group identity). Individuals who identify with other in-group members think of their in-group as a good group and derive positive psychological benefits from the positive status of a group.

In order to uphold a positive self image, when the value of a group is impugned, group members work to preserve positive group traits or identify with a different higher status group when permitted. In the face of group based threats, group members will respond in ways according to the investment and identification with the group (Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 2002; Pérez, 2015b). The literature is clear that high identifiers, those group members who see the group as a central part of who they are, respond to threats in ways that preserve the group’s positive distinctiveness (Ellemers et al., 1997; Pérez, 2015b). In contrast, those who are weak identifiers do not rely on the group to maintain a positive self image. In the face of group threats, low identifiers do not act to preserve the group’s positive distinctiveness and may distance themselves from the group if such an option is available (Ellemers et al., 1997; Garcia Bedolla, 2005; Pérez, 2015b).

Complicating this model are notions of social identity complexity (Roccas and Brewer, 2002) and identity repertoires (Chandra, 2012; Laitin, 1998; Posner, 2004), that define an individual as the collection of “all the nomi-

nal categories ... for which she has the attributes of membership” (Chandra, 2012, 157). These conceptual advances are valuable because they acknowledge an increasingly shared understanding that individuals possess multiple affinities, some of which may be politicized while others are not (Huddy, 2003). Of course, consistent with SIT and SCT, the salience of any given identity within one’s portfolio is contingent on the the environmental and social context where they find themselves (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). While the political context may determine which identities become politically consequential (Posner, 2004; Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016), that still leaves undeveloped why, psychologically, individuals who share components (e.g., attachment to individual social identity categories) of an identity portfolio would respond in distinct ways to political attacks that target specific parts of one’s panoply of social identities. Therefore, while identities in a portfolio certainly extend beyond racial and ethnic categories, we are particularly interested in the way that direct threats to overlapping yet distinct identities elicit distinct responses. As a result we see the rich internal diversity of social identity categories among Latinos and the 2016 presidential rhetoric as an ideal scenario to test our theory.

### **Unpacking the Identity-to-Politics Link Given Social Identity Portfolios**

We use the term identity portfolio to reflect the collection of operative social identities that an individual possesses. When we describe a component of an identity portfolio as politicized we are saying that it has been rendered politically consequential. For example, when a candidate impugns the worth of a group such as Latinos, the Latino social identity is now salient or relevant to the political responses of individuals who attach themselves to that group (Pérez, 2015b). The degree of response is contingent on the strength of attachment to the impugned social category (Ellemers et al., 2002, 1997).

However, the political stimulus that politicized the Latino identity in this example comes in the form of a broadside that implicates Latinos in general and not one that targets a specific facet of one’s identity (e.g., national origin, Spanish language proficiency, nativity, etc.). We contend that the former circumstance provokes a more uniform response among Latinos because the worth of the entire pan-ethnic group is impugned as opposed to certain identity segments that exist under the Latino umbrella. In these cases, existing work, such as linked fate or group consciousness, may fully explain the outcome of interest. By contrast, direct and targeted attacks activate responses that expose the hinges connecting robustly related but distinct social categories (e.g., national origin, Spanish language proficiency, nativity, etc.), and therefore could activate distinct responses conditional on variation in attachment to the categories attacked and the possibility of attaching to higher status groups. In other words, as we discuss in detail below, we suggest that a targeted attack towards Mexican heritage Latinos should not be interpreted

in the same way as one focused on 1) the pan-ethnic group Latinos as a whole or 2) non-Mexican heritage Latinos.

We insist that responses to hostile attacks that focus on a certain segment of one's identity portfolio are consequential for politics. Specifically, we reason that in the face of a direct threat to a salient identity category within one's portfolio, strong identifiers with the threatened group will respond to maintain the group's positive distinctiveness because individuals derive a positive self image from the status of the group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and because the targeted threat raises the salience of that segment of one's identity (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Ellemers et al., 2002, 1997). A direct xenophobic attack provokes a stronger response because the attack leaves no question about whose worth in particular is devalued.

Among those who share an identity category with the threatened group (i.e., a social category is shared across both portfolios), but are not the *direct* recipients of the threat, such indirect xenophobic attacks are unlikely to pique the same responses as those who were directly targeted by the threat. Here we suspect that the response to the hostile rhetoric will be conditional on the ability to attach one's identity to a higher status group that is not under direct threat. In the case of Latinos, our test case, we suspect that non-Mexican heritage Latinos have and choose the option to identify with their national origin group and derive the positive psychological group benefits from that new attachment. Social Identity Theory predicts that individuals can seek higher status groups as a response to maintain a positive self image when their current group is being devalued as opposed to engaging in pro-group activities to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Ellemers et al., 2002, 1999). Thus, we expect those who have little investment in the social category of the threatened group to not engage in pro-group activities but instead ground their identity in a group outside of direct threat.

### **The Diversity and Fluidity of Latino Identities**

The extant literature tells us that those who identify strongly with a group are most impacted by threats to the group and in response, will behave in a way that increases the worth of the group in order to maintain one's positive self image (Pérez, 2015a,b). Research on Latino politics has documented extensively how Latinos reacted with frustration and political engagement when faced with policies and rhetoric that negatively targeted immigrants (Pantoja et al., 2001, 2004; Barreto et al., 2005). Particularly, in *Mobilizing Inclusion*, Ramírez (2013) argues that the contentious political environment and the growth of Latino advocacy groups in the mid-1990s in California resulted in heightened levels of naturalization and political participation among California Latinos. Much of what we know in Latino politics today emerged from this literature; we see our contribution as a natural extension of this research.

However, for our purposes, the availability of social identity categories within Latinos' identity portfolio provide the opportunity to test a set of implications from the identity portfolio framework. Latinos in the U.S. are an ideal group to test these theoretical expectations because of the the shared social identity categories across various group members despite the heterogeneity in the population. Latinos, as in the broad, pan-ethnic group, are made up of people who trace their heritage to a number of Latin American countries and Spain. Shared cultural traits, including Catholicism and use of Spanish language, as well as similar nation-state building histories vis-a-vis the United States, provide a foundation for a broad social category, one that was also constructed and imposed for political and social purposes (Beltran, 2010; Mora, 2014). At the same time, despite the Latino social category shared by many to varying degree of attachment, national origin identities and the cultural practices with those national origin groups remain important. Researchers have observed that continuous immigration from, and geographic proximity to, their place of origin, as well as socioeconomic and phenotypical characteristic have led Latinos to continue to embrace their national origin culture and maintain connected identities even across generations (Jiménez, 2010; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Finally, the many Latinos in the U.S. trace their origin to the U.S. and while their cultural and familial background may be located within the larger Latino umbrella or in a single national origin group, these individuals very much see themselves as part of the U.S. polity with full fledged citizenship.

Most important for our purposes here, there is extensive variation in the degree to which Latinos identify with various components in their identity portfolios. Some Latinos maintain strong national origin ties, some see being Latino as a central part of who they are, while others exhibit both, strong Latino *and* strong national origin identities (Fraga et al., 2010). Still others may shed all connections to any national origin or pan-ethnic categorization. Some Latinos may exhibit some combination of national origin *and* Latino *and* American attachments. Instead of privileging the role of a single social identity category in explaining political responses, we offer a way to understand the differences in political behavior that a more nuanced identity structure produces.

We apply our identity portfolio framework to understand Latino political behavior in the 2016 election. Despite the overwhelming rejection of Donald J. Trump, around 18-19% of Latinos did support him.<sup>2</sup> While 20% is certainly low as a whole, we suggest that applying the identity portfolio framework adds considerable explanatory power since we don't suspect that the 80/20 breakdown was uniform across all strata of the Latino population. We argue that Trump's hostile rhetoric throughout the election had a negative impact on how Latinos responded to him, yet we think the rejection of Trump varied depending on various identity structures within an individual.

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<sup>2</sup> The Edison Exit Poll suggested that over 30% of Latinos supported Trump. However, after the election a number of political scientists found numbers much closer to 20% across a wide number of states.

In the context of the 2016 election, we suggest that among Mexican heritage Latinos who strongly identify with their national origin, we expect to see the strongest opposition towards Trump since they will be responding to preserve the group's positive distinctiveness (H1) (Ellemers et al., 2002; Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1997). Mexican heritage Latinos were directly implicated by Trump and we think they will respond to the group-based threat by taking direct pro-group action and not supporting Trump (Pérez, 2015b). Among non-Mexican heritage Latinos, we expect them to oppose Trump but their opposition would not be as high as strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos. Since non-Mexican heritage Latinos are outside the direct threat, the set of possible responses is larger. Those who are strongly identified with their national origin may feel a strong connection with their Mexican heritage counterparts and also reject Trump at strong levels. However, in order to maintain a positive self image, there could be a subset who strengthen their identity attachment with their national origin group, recognizing the possibility of moving to a higher status group in the face of threat as a way of maintaining a positive self image. Because of this, we expect high identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos to strongly reject Trump but not to the same degree as Mexican heritage Latinos. Thus, we expect to see a distinguishable difference in support for Trump between strong identifying Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos. Lastly, we expect that weak identifiers, regardless of national origin heritage, will display weaker opposition to Trump than the high identifiers, but we do not expect these findings to be consistent since weak identifiers do not respond to hostile rhetoric in a way to preserve a positive self image (H2).

We test these hypotheses in the context of the 2016 presidential election. We contend that the 2016 election context was distinct since many of Trump's remarks were directed towards individuals of Mexican heritage. Donald Trump began his campaign, with the following statement, "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. ... They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists" (Trump, 2016). This was followed by consistent rhetoric geared towards Mexico about the building of a wall across the entire border. Trump repeatedly said that the U.S. will build the wall, but Mexico will pay for it. His campaign speeches continued to highlight numerous issues and problems associated with the southern border. On February 24, he wrote on Twitter, "The Mexican legal system is corrupt, as is much of Mexico. Pay me the money that is owed me now - and stop sending criminals over our border" (Trump, 2016). In June 2016, Trump called out U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel as being biased and unable to fairly proceed over a legal case involving then candidate Trump due to his Mexican heritage, despite being a native born U.S. citizen. Since the focus of the xenophobic anti-immigrant rhetoric was so often directed towards those of Mexican heritage, we can exploit how different national origin groups under the Latino umbrella responded to Trump's messaging.

Existing theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand the complexities and contours of Latino political behavior. Most notably, the concept of linked fate has been transported into Latino politics as a way of understanding the political behavior of the Latino group (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Masuoka, 2006). While we think these works are important, we suggest that the identity portfolio framework we identified above has greater explanatory power and can be applied outside the case of Latinos and beyond racial and ethnic identities. Linked fate, as originally developed for understanding Black political behavior, largely rests on the core concept of the Black utility heuristic, developed through shared historical experience that connects individual Blacks' life chances and those of the larger group (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993). Because of this, Dawson (1994) argues that race still defines political attitudes and behaviors despite stratification across the SES spectrum. Among Latinos, this theoretical framework falls short in explaining why some Latinos were supportive of Trump despite his constant hostile rhetoric. Yes, Latinos who are high in linked fate are less supportive of Trump, but as our analyses below reveal, even after controlling for linked fate, the identity portfolio framework offers additional explanatory power to understand the variation in support for Trump. We think our theoretical framework offers a significant theoretical advancement in understanding the political behaviors of a group with such nuanced and complex social identity structures as well as greater explanatory power in empirically modeling the respondents behaviors and preferences.

## Research Design and Methods

To illuminate the relationship between identity portfolios and targeted threat, we examine how variation in Latinos' distinct elements within one's identity portfolio explains support for Donald J. Trump, a candidate who made consistent and disparaging rhetorical threats to Latinos of Mexican heritage. We argue that rhetoric towards immigrants and Latinos in the 2016 election was different than past elections and because of this, the 2016 electoral context serves as a treated election which we compare to past time periods. Existing work has demonstrated a clear connection between hostile rhetoric and politically relevant outcomes conditional on the strength of identity in an experimental context (Pérez, 2015b). Our goal is to expand the evidence base from experimental findings to an externally valid, real world context.

The data for this project come from four large-n surveys with sizable Latino samples. We begin with an analysis of 2016 using the 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS 2016), which was fielded in the U.S. immediately after the 2016 election and collected responses from 3,004 Latinos. We focus on two outcome variables to evaluate the political implications of targeted threats on a segment of one's identity portfolio. The first question asks whether or not the respondent voted or would have voted for Trump. This question was asked to all respondents. If the respondent was a registered

voter and had indicated that they voted, the question asked who they voted for. For those who were registered and did not vote and those who were not registered, the question asked if you would have or could have voted, who would you have voted for. 1 = voted for Trump and 0 = voted for someone else. As Table 1 shows, while 80.2% (n=2,409) of the Latino respondents did not support Trump, 19.8% (594) of the CMPS sample voted or would have voted for Trump.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 1 Distribution of Dependent Variables**

Variable	Levels	n	%	$\sum$ %
Support Trump	<i>No Support</i>	2409	80.2	80.2
	<i>Support</i>	594	19.8	100.0
	all	3003	100.0	
Trump Favorability	<i>Very Unfavorable</i>	1830	62.7	62.7
	<i>Somewhat Unfavorable</i>	406	13.9	76.6
	<i>Somewhat Favorable</i>	434	14.9	91.5
	<i>Very Favorable</i>	248	8.5	100.0
	all	2918	100.0	

The second outcome we use is overall favorability for Trump measured with a single question that asks, “Please indicate if you have a favorable view or unfavorable view of each person. If you haven’t heard of them or are unfamiliar with them, that’s fine.” Possible responses include: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable, and not familiar with them. This was coded so that very favorable was assigned a score of four and very unfavorable a score of zero, with other categories accordingly assigned integer scores in between. We set those that were not familiar with Trump to missing and excluded them from the analysis. Table 1 shows the distribution.<sup>4</sup> A majority of Latinos (62.7%) had very unfavorable views towards Trump. However, 14.9% of the sample had somewhat favorable feelings and 8.5% had very favorable feelings towards Trump.

We are aware that the variation on these variables is somewhat skewed as relatively few Latinos voted for Trump or had favorable views towards him. However, the direction of skew provides a useful research opportunity to fully investigate a theory when we are bound by floor effects. Explaining variation within a variable in a context where the majority of the sample did not vote for Trump or has very unfavorable views towards him requires our identity measures to be quite powerful to reliably recover a significant estimate.

### *Identity Variables*

One of the benefits of the 2016 CMPS is the effort of the research team to capture identity quite broadly and comprehensively. Unlike most surveys with one

<sup>3</sup> Figure ?? shows this distribution in the appendix.

<sup>4</sup> Figure ?? shows the distribution for favorability.

or two variables, the 2016 CMPS asks multiple, theoretically driven identity questions. Respondents were asked, “How much is being [NATIONAL ORIGIN (eg. Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.)] an important part of how you see yourself?” The possible responses were very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important. This measure is consistent with the SIT framework we are drawing on and used in other studies and data sets (Pérez, 2015b). We highlight the distribution in Table 2.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 2 Distribution of Key Independent Variables**

Variable	Levels	n	%	$\sum$ %
National Origin Identity	<i>Not at all Important</i>	166	5.5	5.5
	<i>Not very important</i>	350	11.7	17.2
	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	904	30.1	47.3
	<i>Very important</i>	1583	52.7	100.0
	all	3003	100.0	
Mexican	<i>Other</i>	1505	50.1	50.1
	<i>Mexican</i>	1498	49.9	100.0
	all	3003	100.0	
Generation	<i>First</i>	871	29.0	29.0
	<i>Second</i>	1206	40.2	69.2
	<i>Third</i>	926	30.8	100.0
	all	3003	100.0	

Scholars have also highlighted the importance of linked fate as a predictor of group solidarity (Dawson, 1994; Leach et al., 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010). We incorporate a Latino linked fate question to rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by this dimension of group attachment. Our measure of linked fate is based on responses to a question that asks: “Do you think what happens generally to [Hispanics/Latinos] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” We also control immigrant generation, whether the respondent’s national heritage is Cuban, skin color, liberal ideology, Democrat, political interest, age, female, income, and having a college degree.

#### *2006, 2008, and 2012 Contexts*

In order to demonstrate that the dynamics of Latino identity were distinct prior to 2016 we use the 2006 Latino National Survey, 2008 CMPS, and 2012 ANES. These surveys are very similar to the CMPS 2016 in terms of scope and substance. The 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) was conducted in 2006 during Bush’s second term, the 2008 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS 2008) was fielded immediately after the 2008 election between Obama and McCain, the 2012 American National Election Survey (ANES) was fielded in the 2012 electoral context where Romney faced Obama.

<sup>5</sup> A graphical distribution is shown in the Appendix in Figure ??

While there are slight differences in the timing and content, we can exploit useful comparisons between Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos. We use these surveys because they offer large enough Latino samples and have similar independent and dependent variables. We did our best to model the outcomes across these surveys as close to the model for 2016, however there are some slight differences in the way identity was captured across each survey. In the results section, we make note of these departures and provide tables of full regression results in the Appendix.

If our findings in the main analysis are not specific to the 2016 electoral context, then we should see evidence that Mexican heritage Latinos always express distinct responses on similar outcome measures conditional on strength of identity when compared to their non-Mexican counterparts in other years and electoral contexts.

## Results

We begin by modeling the likelihood of voting for Trump in 2016. While only citizens were eligible to vote, this question was asked to all respondents to determine who they would have voted for if they could or would have. We model this binary outcome with a logistic regression and present the coefficients in Table ???. The key independent variable of interest is an interaction term between the centrality of national origin group and an indicator for Mexican heritage Latinos. Looking at the interaction term in the first column of Table ??, we see a negative and significant term  $\beta = -0.314$ , ( $se = 0.121$ ), which is expected by our first hypothesis. Since these coefficients are not directly interpretable, we present the predicted probability of voting for Trump using post-estimation in Figure ??.

Figure ?? suggests that the overall probability of voting for Trump among Latinos is quite low. The average level of electoral support for Trump among Latinos is 0.19, similar to the 0.17 estimated probability of supporting Trump among strong identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos. By comparison, and as our first test of H1, the model estimates the probability of voting for Trump among strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos is 0.09, even controlling partisanship, ideology, socio-economic status, and other known correlates of candidate-related judgments. The differences in the probability of voting for Trump between strong identifying Mexicans and non-Mexicans is about 10 percentage points, compelling evidence that Trump's targeted rhetoric in the 2016 election impacted Latinos of Mexican heritage strongest. If this was not the case, and Trump's attacks were seen as anti-Latino or even anti-immigrant, we would expect no separation between national origin groups among the high identifiers. Instead we see that Mexican heritage Latinos who see their group as an important part of who they are reject Trump, presumably in order to maintain positive group distinctiveness.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> As a placebo check, we also model the probability of voting for Presidential candidate Hilary Clinton for Strong ID Mexican heritage Latinos. It could be the case that Strong

**Table 3** The Effect of National Origin Heritage and Identity Centrality


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Trump	Trump Favorability
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>ordered logit</i>
National Origin ID	-0.019 (0.080)	-0.140* (0.063)
Mexican	0.627 (0.370)	0.544 (0.291)
National ID X Mexican	-0.318** (0.113)	-0.236** (0.088)
Generation	0.328*** (0.070)	0.099 (0.053)
Cuban	1.039*** (0.202)	0.859*** (0.163)
Light Skin Color	-0.128 (0.155)	-0.018 (0.121)
Linked Fate	-0.355*** (0.049)	-0.287*** (0.037)
Liberal Scale	-0.907*** (0.056)	-0.755*** (0.042)
Political Interest	0.350*** (0.062)	0.216*** (0.047)
Age	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)
Female	-0.356** (0.110)	-0.277** (0.086)
Low-Income	-0.193 (0.153)	-0.048 (0.120)
Medium-Income	0.040 (0.161)	-0.076 (0.128)
Missing-Income	-0.408 (0.234)	-0.385* (0.178)
College	-0.053 (0.120)	-0.267** (0.094)
Constant	1.560*** (0.439)	
Observations	2,994	2,909
Log Likelihood	-1,197.759	-2,770.376
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,427.517	

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

We also anticipated that low identifiers, regardless of national origin heritage would not be impacted by Trump's rhetoric since weak identifiers do not derive a positive self image from the overall status of the group. The results in Figure ?? confirm this expectation. Among the weak identifiers, there is complete overlap in the confidence intervals for the estimates corresponding to the

---

ID Mexican heritage Latinos support presidential candidates differently and thus always support candidates at different rates compared to their non-Mexican counterparts. In an identical model specification, we find no support of any difference for the likelihood of voting for Clinton. These results are presented in the Appendix.

**Fig. 1 Predicted Probability of Voting for Trump given Identity Strength and National Origin Heritage**


Notes: This figure shows the predicted probability of voting for Trump using the 2016 CMPS. The results were obtained with post-estimation from the estimates in the first column of Table ???. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.

two different heritage groups, suggesting that national origin heritage does not impact their probability of voting for Trump. Second, these estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the overall average level of Latino support (0.19). These two findings together suggest that weak identifiers, regardless of national heritage, did not respond to Trump's hostile rhetoric.

When we turn to our second outcome of interest, we uncover evidence that corroborates our initial findings. We model the overall favorability towards Trump with ordered logistic regression. In order to show the substantive effects making the results more straightforward and easier to understand, we present plots of predicted probabilities with separate markers to indicate national origins and strength of identity. The coefficients are shown in Table ??.

Our first hypothesis predicts that Mexican heritage Latinos who are high identifiers should demonstrate the strongest opposition towards Trump, similar to what we saw above with the likelihood to vote outcome. We regress Trump's favorability on an interaction between national origin identity centrality and Mexican heritage. If our hypothesis is supported, then we should expect a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term. As we show in column two of Table ??, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant  $\beta = -0.230$ , ( $se = 0.090$ ). In terms of substantive effects, we illustrate the predicted probability of very unfavorable attitudes toward Trump in Figure ??. In this figure, we show the probability that a respondent in our sample holds a very unfavorable attitude towards Trump.

**Fig. 2 Predicted Probability of Strongly Unfavorable attitudes toward Trump given Identity Strength and National Origin Heritage**



the

*Notes: This figure shows the predicted probability of reporting a very unfavorable view towards Trump using the 2016 CMPS. The results were obtained with post-estimation simulation from estimates in the second column of Table ???. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.*

High identifying Mexican heritage Latinos have the highest probability of reporting a very unfavorable attitude towards Trump (0.72). As Figure ?? shows, this is higher than high identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos, whose probability is 0.64. This finding reinforces those from above that high identifying Mexican heritage Latinos felt most targeted by Trump's xenophobic rhetoric. While high identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos are more likely to report very unfavorable ratings towards Trump (0.64), the probability associated is significantly lower than their Mexican heritage counterparts by about 8 percentage points. In terms of our second prediction, the findings in Figure ?? show that weak identifiers are not impacted by Trump's hostile rhetoric. There is no difference in the probability of reporting a very unfavorable view of Trump between national heritage among weak identifiers. Figure ?? and Figure ?? show consistent support of our first hypothesis that strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos are impacted differently by the 2016 campaign context where much of Trump's hostile rhetoric focused on those of Mexican heritage. In order to maintain the group's positive distinctiveness, Mexican heritage Latinos almost universally rejected Trump. Weak identifiers, as predicted, were no different than the larger Latino sample in their response to towards Trump, presumably because they did not feel com-

pelled to maintain the positive distinctiveness of that facet of their identity portfolio.<sup>7</sup>

So far the results show supportive evidence that Mexicans and non-Mexicans responded differently in terms of their assessment of Trump. However, this difference is only present among strong identifiers which supports our claim that it is identity and not other sub-grouping differences that distinguishes Mexican heritage Latinos from non-Mexican heritage Latinos. We argue that these differences are the result of Trump's rhetoric being more anti-Mexican rather than anti-Latino or anti-immigrant. While our results show statistically significant differences between Mexican heritage Latinos and Non-Mexican heritage Latinos we want to rule out the possibility that these differences are not the product of Trump's rhetoric observed during the 2016 election and would exist even if Trump's rhetoric had not been present.

If Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos interpreted Trump's hostile rhetoric as an attack against the entire Latino community and all national origin groups, we should not expect to see significant and consistent differences by heritage groups among the high identifiers (Pérez, 2015b; Ellemers et al., 1997). However, as we showed in the main results section, given the nature of the threats, Trump's targeted rhetoric against Mexican heritage Latinos produced different attitudes and behaviors towards Trump. Our interpretation would be undermined, however, if Mexican heritage Latinos *always* had lower favorability and support towards Republican candidates. To ensure this is not what is happening, we ran similar models using a number of previous surveys with large enough Latino samples: 2004 Latino National Survey, 2008 CMPS, and 2012 ANES. Across all those other time periods, Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos had nearly identical responses on similar outcomes.

### *2012 ANES Feelings Toward Romney*

We begin by examining how Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos evaluated Romney in 2012. Figure ?? shows the predicted feeling thermometer for Romney among Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos given the strength of in-group identity.<sup>8</sup> As Figure ?? shows, strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos support Romney at levels nearly identical to non-Mexicans. None of the differences in Figure ?? are statistically different. The outcome that we analyze for the 2012 election is a 0-100 feeling thermometer, a standard question asked on the ANES. Strength of in-group identity was measured with one question that asked how central being Latino was. This question is slightly different than one that taps national origin centrality, however, as the only social identity variable available to sort individual by strength of in-group identity in this sample, it does provide a way to distinguish Latinos according to the


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<sup>7</sup> We also evaluate a model where attitudes towards Clinton serve as the dependent variable. In this analysis, we see no difference between strong ID Mexican heritage Latino and their non-Mexican counterparts. These results are included in the Appendix.

<sup>8</sup> Table ?? in the appendix shows the full models for 2012, 2008 and 2006

configurations of their identity portfolio. Any hostile rhetoric from Romney or the Republican party in the context of the 2012 election season had little impact on how Latinos felt about Romney given variation in identity centrality or national origin heritage.

**Fig. 3 Predicted Feeling Thermometer Mitt Romney in 2012**




*Notes: This figure shows the predicted feeling thermometer towards presidential candidate Mitt Romney in 2012 using the 2012 ANES. The results were obtained with post-estimation simulation. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.*

### *2008 CMPS: Support for McCain*

Our second electoral context is in 2008. We use the 2008 CMPS, which took place after Obama's successful election. One minor challenge with the data from the 2008 CMPS is that it does not include a comparable indicator for the strength of national origin identity that is available in survey data collected in other electoral contexts. However, it does offer linked fate as a reasonable proxy indicator that we know is conceptually related to the strength of national origin identity (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Vargas et al., 2017). In other words, the same individuals who score high in linked fate are also likely to be assigned scores that indicate strong national origin identity. In Figure ?? we show the probability of support for McCain given an interaction between Mexican heritage and linked fate. Consistent with our expectation, there is no separation between Mexican and non-Mexican heritage Latinos across strong and weak levels of linked fate, which is consistent with our other evidence that is based on indicators of strength of national origin identity. Mexican heritage

Latinos are not less likely to support or vote for Republican candidates outside of a threatening electoral context as we saw in 2016.<sup>9</sup>

**Fig. 4 Predicted Support John McCain 2008**




*Notes: This figure shows the predicted feeling thermometer towards presidential candidate John McCain in 2008 using the 2008 CMPS. The results were obtained with post-estimation simulation. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.*

#### 2006 LNS: Support for Bush

In the 2006 LNS we looked at a four-point favorability scale for Bush, which is very similar to our Trump favorability measure. We conducted a similar analysis where we regress Bush favorability on an interaction between strength of national identity and an indicator for Mexican heritage. Figure ?? shows the predicted level of support for President Bush using the 2006 LNS. As we saw in 2012 and 2008, the 2006 survey shows no distinction between national origin heritage or strength of identity. The differences between national origin heritage among the strong identifiers are not statistically distinguishable, despite the point estimate for Mexican heritage Latinos being slightly lower than the estimate for non-Mexican heritage Latinos.

These findings provide strong evidence and external validity that there was something different in the 2016 election context in the ways in which Latinos responded towards Republican presidential candidates. While existing research

<sup>9</sup> In analyses not included, we ran a linked fate model using the 2016 data and found consistent results with the results shown above. This suggests that linked fate, an alternative measure of identity centrality, fits our overall story that the 2016 election context was different from previous electoral contexts.

**Fig. 5 Predicted Support for President Bush in 2006**

*Notes: This figure shows the predicted favorability towards President Bush in 2006 using the 2006 LNS. The results were obtained with post-estimation simulation. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.*

suggests that group based threats push high identifiers to respond in ways to maintain the positive value of the group, previous electoral and non-electoral contexts did not transmit threatening environments as we see in 2016 towards a certain segment of the Latino community. Not until the 2016 election, when Trump specifically disparages Mexicans as a group, do we observe difference in Latino identity portfolios translating into differences in attitudes towards different presidential candidates.


### Results by Generation

There is one final concern that we want to rule out in order to ensure the robustness of our interpretation of the results using the 2016 CMPS. While national identity persists even beyond first generation it is also true that the salience of this identity is strongest among first generation Latinos. It is possible that Trump's rhetoric could have a greater effect on first generation Mexican heritage Latinos, that is, Mexican immigrants. While our models do control for generation we want to rule out the possibility that the effects are being driven entirely by first generation Mexicans.

In order to isolate each generation we run separate models on sub-samples for each generation. In addition, we extracted predicted probabilities and counterfactuals of interest out of these models and observed similar results as the ones observed on the main model which can be a useful method to observe variance when the observations are independent but not identically distributed

(Shao and Xhi, 1989; Babu, 1992). We illustrate our results by generation in Figure ??.

**Fig. 6 Predicted Favorability of Trump by Generation**



*Notes: This figure shows the predicted probability of reporting a very unfavorable view towards Trump using the 2016 CMPS sub-setting by generation. The results were obtained with post-estimation simulation. All control variables are at the mean value. 95% confidence intervals.*

Figure ?? presents predicted probability of very unfavorable views towards Trump for each generation (first, second, and third). In the first two panels, first and second generations respectively, we see results that conform to our findings presented in Figure ?. High identifying Mexican heritage Latinos are significantly more likely to have a very unfavorable view of Trump than any other Latinos, especially high identifying non-Mexican heritage Latinos. This separation was largest among the first generation. However, as the second panel in Figure ?? shows, second generation high identifying Mexican heritage Latinos have the highest overall probability of reporting a very unfavorable view of Trump. Second generation high identifying non-Mexicans are also much more likely to hold unfavorable views towards Trump, compared to their counterparts in other generations. This is a surprising and unanticipated finding which we further explore in the discussion. Finally, by the third generation, the observed differences between national origins declines among the high identifiers. Among the weak identifiers, we see largely consistent results across generations that suggest our second hypothesis is robust to generational differences. Since low identifiers do not derive positive self worth from the status of the group, we see little variation in responses across the different generations. This pattern is consistent with the theoretical expectation that low identifiers are unlikely to respond in ways that maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group.

## Discussion

In this paper, we showed how targeted hostile rhetoric produces differential responses among individuals who share identity categories across distinct identity portfolios. We theorized how targeted rhetoric should produce different outcomes depending on the location of the targeted rhetoric within one's identity portfolio. We tested this theory in the context of the 2016 presidential election where much of Trump's hostile rhetoric was focused on Mexican heritage Latinos. We found that Mexican heritage Latinos, those most directly attacked, were least supportive of Trump. As predicted, regardless of heritage, weak identifiers did not respond to the xenophobic rhetoric by seeking to affirm the value and distinctiveness of the group. Non-Mexican heritage Latinos, those outside the direct threat consistently evaluated Trump very unfavorably and were less likely to vote for him, suggesting there could be some shared support between high identifiers. Yet those of non-Mexican heritage did not reject Trump to the same extent as strong identifying Mexican heritage Latinos. We compared these results to similar control periods in 2006, 2008, and 2012 and show that the response of Mexican heritage Latinos was unique to 2016.

The extant literature has made clear that strong identifiers, those who see the group as a central part of who they are, are the most responsive to hostile rhetoric (Pérez, 2015b,a; Ellemers et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2010). A wealth of work in social psychology and political science confirms that in the face of threat, strong identifiers respond by increasing the distinctiveness of the group since the group status is directly connected to their self image (Leach et al., 2010; Ellemers et al., 2002). We added to this conversation by considering a situation where threat is directed at a specific category within one's identity portfolio. These findings substantially build on existing experimental work. By expanding the theoretical claims through the concept of identity portfolios, and by directly testing these theories in an externally valid context, this study assuages concerns about the generalizability of insights gleaned from experimental results.

Future work should consider these findings as a starting point for understanding how identity portfolios are related to political outcomes, an area of research with wide appeal but relatively little work, both theoretically and empirically. We badly need more work that considers the role of identity portfolios as they relate to politics and political outcomes since many individuals do have multiple identities many of which are distinct yet robustly related that can be used to make political decisions across various conditions, contexts, and domains. Future research could consider the relationship between microlevel contexts and identity portfolios given the recent work connecting local context and identity (Wilcox-Archuleta, *ress*) Furthermore, candidates and other political elites use identity based appeals more and more when mobilizing or persuading voters. We think Latinos are one of many possible examples and should only be the starting point for further analysis. While the pan-ethnic umbrella has received much attention recently, has this emphasis come at a

cost to national heritage or even American identities? It's clear from our analysis and existing research that Latinos possess multiple social identities in their identity portfolio, all which can be connected to politics at certain times and under certain conditions. Future work should explore these conditions further and look for new opportunities to test the identity portfolio framework.

We suspect that the Social Identity tradition offers the language and framework for such analysis. While it's clear that Mexican heritage and non-Mexican heritage Latinos reacted differently in the context of the 2016 election, we are unable to fully explain the mechanism between a hostile campaign context and our political outcomes. Our assumption, as we alluded to earlier, is that non-Mexican heritage Latinos extensively embraced their national origin group to maintain a positive self image by distancing themselves from the pan-ethnic group. Mexican heritage Latinos were not afforded the same opportunities to associate with an alternative social category since they could not easily establish an identity in a higher status group. Instead, we suspect such a rejection of Trump by strongly identified Mexican heritage Latinos is evidence that they achieved a positive self image by working to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group. We did see the gap close among third and greater generation Latinos, suggesting that these individuals could likely establish their identity with another category when those options fit their real world experience and are accessible. In this case, we suspect these individuals demonstrate a stronger American identity. However, without an experimental design, it's impossible to fully test this hypothesis. We believe that those who share more in common with other national heritage Latinos will be less likely to disassociate with the threatened group when other groups are threatened.

Our findings also demonstrate broad implications for elite messaging and elite behavior. We think future work should explore the extent to which political elites strategically use identity based appeals to mobilize or persuade voters as well as the repercussions of those appeals across other groups. While Trump's xenophobic appeals may have mobilized select groups of voters, our paper shows the detrimental effect of those appeals to the one group Trump targeted. Our results suggest that targeted threats have a spillover effect for those who share a social identity category across identity portfolios but are outside the direct threat.

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## Supporting Information


**Table SI 0.4** Effect of National Origin Heritage and Identity Centrality - 2006, 2008, 2012

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Romney - 2012	McCain - 2008	Bush - 2006
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>logistic</i>	<i>ordered logit</i>
Latino ID	0.714 (0.966)		
Linked Fate		-0.038 (0.118)	
National Origin ID			0.089 (0.056)
Mexican	8.547 (5.125)	0.660* (0.326)	0.409 (0.246)
Latino ID X Mexican	-2.104 (1.311)		
Linked Fate X Mexican		-0.223 (0.170)	
National ID X Mexican			-0.113 (0.068)
Cuban	-2.280 (3.372)	1.342** (0.442)	0.176 (0.131)
Born US	-1.300 (1.812)	0.586** (0.222)	-0.371*** (0.062)
Party ID (Republican)	8.269*** (0.425)	3.633*** (0.267)	0.394*** (0.015)
College	-1.820 (2.043)	0.805** (0.245)	-0.408*** (0.075)
Age	1.148*** (0.249)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009*** (0.002)
Income		0.073 (0.060)	-0.068*** (0.015)
Constant	5.663 (4.812)	-3.620*** (0.551)	
Observations	886	910	4,329
R <sup>2</sup>	0.331		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.325		
Log Likelihood		-348.951	-6,369.595
Akaike Inf. Crit.		717.903	
Residual Std. Error	23.651 (df = 877)		
F Statistic	54.215*** (df = 8; 877)		

*Note:*


\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

**Fig. SI 0.7 Distribution of Latino (pan-ethnic) linked fate**




*Notes:*


**Fig. SI 0.8 Distribution of electoral support for Trump**



*Notes: This figure shows the distribution of voting for Trump. Source 2016 CMPS.*

**Fig. SI 0.9 Distribution of favorability for Trump**

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of favorability towards Trump. Source 2016 CMPS.

**Fig. SI 0.10 Distribution of centrality of national origin**

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the key independent variable, centrality of national origin group identity. Source 2016 CMPS.